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Abstract 
 
 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Disclosure of Donor Information) 
Regulations 2004 removed the right of gamete donors to anonymity and gave donor-
conceived-offspring a legal right to identify, and possibly contact, their donors on 
reaching the age of 18. The legislation was introduced because it was believed that 
donor-conceived-offspring have a right to information about themselves, including 
their genetic identity, and that denying them this information is harmful. 
During the consultation period prior to this legislation being introduced considerable 
emphasis was placed on the interests, needs and rights of the donor-conceived-
offspring to access their genetic identity, and potentially contact their donors and 
donor-siblings. Whilst this is understandable, far less attention has been paid to the 
interests, needs and rights of the donors, recipient parents and their respective 
families.  
The potential impact of open-identity legislation on these other parties is huge, 
extending from the impact on donation numbers through to the psychological effect of 
discovering previously unknown family members. Despite this, they have been largely 
overlooked and their interests and rights subordinated to those of the donor-
conceived-offspring with seemingly little discussion. 
The donor-conceived-offspring, donors, recipient parents and their wider families exist 
as ‘spider-web’ families, held together by complex genetic, legal and social links.  
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Exercising the interests and rights of each member of the spider-web family has an 
effect on the other members of the family; the interests and rights of each must be 
balanced against each other to determine whose interests and rights take precedence.  
By exploring the bioethical and legal rights of the donor, donor-conceived-offspring 
and their respective families following the introduction of the Disclosure of Donor 
Information Regulations 2004, this dissertation examines whether the rights of the 
donor-conceived-offspring should be the ruling bioethical principle regarding the 
disclosure of donor information in the UK. 
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Chapter One: Gamete Donation in the UK 
 
 
A History of donation 
Successful artificial insemination in humans is reported to have occurred first in 1785 
(Agarwal 2007 p539) but it did not enter clinical practice in England until the late 
1930s, when it was generally carried out in secret. In 1945, the publication of 
gynaecologist Mary Barton’s article in the British Medical Journal (Barton et al 1945 
pp.40-43) describing her artificial insemination (AI) programme was met with outrage 
and the practice was publically condemned. Despite this, it continued and in 1960 the 
Feversham Committee concluded that, while it should generally be discouraged, AI 
might be an acceptable treatment for some infertile couples (BMJ 1960 p379). 
Demand grew and in 1968 it became available on the NHS, if recommended on 
medical grounds (Warnock 1984 p19).  
Although now legal, AI was unregulated and remained a covert practice. Until 1977 the 
donor-conceived-offspring (DCO) was illegitimate and the donor considered the legal 
father (Births and Deaths Registration Act 1954). The husband/partner of the woman 
receiving treatment had no legal responsibilities or duties toward the DCO, although in 
practice he was usually entered as the father on the birth certificate. This involved the 
couple in committing an offence by entering false information on the birth certificate 
but maintained the donor’s anonymity, gave the husband/partner parental rights and 
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protected the family from public scrutiny and disapproval. Alternatively, the couple 
could adopt the DCO (Smart 1987 cited in Lycett et al 2005 p810). 
The publication of the Warnock Committee report in 1984 changed this. The 
Committee was established in 1982 “to consider recent and potential developments in 
medicine and science related to human fertilisation and embryology; to consider what 
policies and safeguards should be applied, including consideration of the social, 
ethical, and legal implications of these developments; and to make 
recommendations." (HFEA 2014(b)). The Committee supported the use of donated 
gametes in fertility treatment and also recommended a change to the law so that “The 
AID [artificial insemination by donor] child should in law be treated as the legitimate 
child of its mother and her husband, where they have both consented to treatment” 
(Warnock 1984 p85). In 1987, the Family Law Reform Act (1987 Part 4) allowed the 
husband of the woman to be legally entered as the father on the birth certificate of 
the DCO (provided he consented to the treatment) and gave him all the attendant 
rights and duties towards that child. 
Although the use of donated gametes was legal and becoming socially more 
acceptable, the donor’s identity was still kept secret and the fact that donated 
gametes had been used was often not disclosed. The Warnock Report recommended 
that gamete donor anonymity should continue, stating “anonymity protects all parties 
not only from legal complications but also from emotional difficulties” (Warnock 1984  
p15). It was believed anonymity was needed to protect the donor legally, to encourage 
donors to donate and to “minimise the invasion of the third party into the family” 
(Warnock 1984 p25). 
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In 1990 the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act was passed, enshrining into 
legislation many of the Warnock Report recommendations. It introduced a system of 
regulation for fertility treatments and put in place systems to record information 
about the types of fertility treatments carried out, the patients and, crucially, about 
the donors themselves.  
 The passing of the HFE Act 1990 secured the legal status and legitimacy of the DCO, 
absolved the donor of all legal rights and duties towards the DCO and maintained 
donor anonymity (HFE Act 1990(c)). Anonymity protected the donor’s identity and 
kept secret the fact that a donor had been used, avoiding the stigma of infertility, 
especially male infertility, uncertainty over social acceptance of such practices and 
potential damage to family relationships (Novaes 1998, Blythe and Moore 2001 cited 
in Blyth and Frith 2008 p75). The HFE Act gave DCO a legal right to access non-
identifying donor information only once they reached 16. Whether or not to tell the 
DCO of their origins was left to the recipient parent(s) to decide. 
Table 1: A summary of the information made legally available to the donor, DCO and donor siblings by 
the HFE Act 1990. 
 
 HFE Act 1990 
 Donor DCO Donor siblings 
Donor identifying information    
Donor physical appearance 
(optional) 
 ● ● 
Donor year and country of birth  ● ● 
Donor statement (optional)  ● ● 
Donor ethnicity  ● ● 
Donor marital status  ● ● 
Children (of donor, naturally 
conceived) 
 ● ● 
(continued on next page) 
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(continued from previous page) 
 HFE Act 1990 
 Donor DCO Donor siblings 
Basic DCO information (number, 
sex, year of birth) 
● 
 
  
Donor sibling non-identifying 
information (via DonorSiblingLink 
– voluntary) 
 ● ● 
Donor sibling identifying 
information (via DonorSiblingLink 
– voluntary) 
 ● ● 
 
Pressure grew during the 1990s to identify donors and in 2004 the HFEA Disclosure of 
Donor Information Regulations (HFEA 2004) were passed. From 1st April 2005 the 
HFEA (2015(b)) collect the following information from donors: 
1) Identifying information: name (and name at the time of donation, if different), 
last known address, date and place of birth, 
2) The donor’s physical appearance (height, weight, eye and hair colour) if 
provided by the donor, 
3) Year and country of birth, 
4) A short statement or goodwill message, if provided by the donor, 
5) Ethnicity, 
6) Marital status, 
7) Whether they had any children, how many and their gender, 
8) Their medical history. 
At the age of 16, DCO can apply to access all the non-identifying information the HFEA 
hold about their donor, and from 18 they can apply to access identifying information. 
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In addition, DCO can also access non-identifying information about their donor siblings 
(number, sex and year of birth) from the age of 16 and identifying information from 
18, provided both parties consent (HFEA 2015(b)), using the voluntary 
DonorSiblingLink service. 
Table 2: A summary of the information made legally available to the donor, DCO, donor siblings, 
recipient parent(s) and naturally conceived children of the donor by the HFE Act 1990 and the 
Disclosure of Donor Information Regulations 2004. Note the dearth of information legally available to 
the donor’s naturally conceived children, especially in comparison to that available to donor siblings. 
 HFE Act 1990 and DDIR 2004 
 Donor DCO Donor 
siblings 
Recipient 
parent(s) 
Naturally 
conceived children 
of donor 
Donor identifying information  ● ●   
Donor physical appearance 
(optional) 
 ● ● ●  
Donor year and country of birth  ● ● ●  
Donor statement (optional)  ● ● ●  
Donor ethnicity  ● ● ●  
Donor marital status  ● ● ●  
Children (of donor, naturally 
conceived) 
 ● ● ●  
Basic DCO information (number, 
sex, year of birth) 
● 
 
 
 
   
Donor sibling non-identifying 
information (via 
DonorSiblingLink – voluntary) 
 ● ●   
Donor sibling identifying 
information (via 
DonorSiblingLink – voluntary) 
 ● ●   
Basic donor sibling information 
(number, sex, year of birth) 
  ● ●  
 
The HFE Act and the Disclosure of Donor Information Regulations (DDIR) also give the 
recipient parent(s) a legal right to access some non-identifying information about the 
donor before the DCO reaches 16. What they do with this information is left up to 
them but they have no legal right to access identifying donor information, even after 
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the DCO reaches 18. DCO cannot contact the donor’s naturally conceived children and 
they cannot contact the DCO, despite sharing a genetic parent.  
 
Where are we now? 
One in seven couples experience some difficulty conceiving (NHS 2014) and one in ten 
are infertile (BMA 2004 p269), requiring the use of assisted reproduction treatments 
(ART) to conceive. Available fertility treatments include in vitro fertilisation (IVF), intra-
cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) and donor insemination (DI).  
In 2013, the HFEA reported that: 
  2379 women underwent a total of 4611 cycles of DI,  
 1886 women were part of an egg-sharing agreement (where women 
undergoing ART donate some of their eggs to subsidise the cost of their 
treatment), or had treatment to produce eggs or embryos for donation, 
 2527 IVF treatment cycles started in 2013 used donor sperm.  
The number of women receiving IVF and DI continues to increase, and the number of 
cycles using donated eggs (around 5% of IVF cycles) (HFEA 2013(a)) is also rising (see 
table 3). 
Between 1992 and 2009, a total of 35957 children were born in the UK as a result of 
donor conception treatments (around 2000 births a year) (HFEA 2013(c)). 
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Table 3: The number of ART cycles undertaken in the UK 2012-2013. (Source: HFEA 2013(a)) 
Treatment type 2012 2013 % change 
IVF/ICSI cycles 62158 64600 +3.9% 
DI cycles 4474 4611 +3.6% 
IVF/ICSI cycles 
using donor eggs 
1659 1886 +13.7% 
IVF/ICSI cycles 
using donor sperm 
2372 2527 +6.5% 
Donor sperm and 
egg cycles (includes 
embryo donation) 
474 693 +46.2% 
 
Prior to the introduction of the DDIR concerns were raised that the removal of donor 
anonymity would be a disincentive to donate, or that it would change the 
demographic of those donating. There was particular concern that this would impact 
disproportionately on donors from certain ethnic groups, making it even harder to 
match donor and recipient. Despite the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee (2005 paragraph.152) identifying the effect on donor numbers as being the 
major contentious issue of ending anonymous donation donor numbers have 
remained relatively stable (see graph 1). The number of newly registered sperm 
donors decreased from 426 in 1993 to 256 in 1998 but since 2005 numbers have 
increased year-on-year and in 2010, 480 new donors were registered (HFEA 2013(c)). 
This has been driven by publicity and recruitment campaigns, organised by individual 
centres and supported by organisations such as the National Gamete Donation Trust 
(NGDT), which have increased the awareness and acceptability of gamete donation. 
The effect of the removal of anonymity on egg donors is harder to predict as many egg 
donors do so as part of egg sharing schemes or donate to someone known to them; 
but despite a decrease in 2005 numbers have been increasing steadily since 2006 
(HFEA 2013(c)). 
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Graph 1: The number of newly registered egg and sperm donors 2004-2013. (Source: HFEA 2014(d)). 
 
 
Despite the increase in new donor registrations there remains a shortage of donated 
gametes in the UK, leading some recipients to seek treatment abroad where waiting 
times may be shorter. Turkmendag et al (2008) suggest that some recipients may also 
seek treatment abroad to avoid UK laws on donor anonymity. 
The demographics of donors, especially sperm donors, has changed considerably over 
the last decade and sperm donors are now more likely to be older, and with children 
of their own (see graph 2). The age of egg donors has remained fairly similar but they 
are now much less likely to have children of their own, possibly due to the increase in 
egg-sharing schemes (HFEA 2005) (see graph 3). 
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Graph 2: The age of newly registered sperm donors by percentage for 1994-5, 2004 and 2013. (Source: 
HFEA 2014(d) and (g)) 
 
 
 
Graph 3: The age of newly registered egg donors by percentage for 1994-5, 2004 and 2013. (Source: 
HFEA 2014(d) and (g)). 
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The increase in younger egg donors and decrease in egg donors with children at the 
time of registration (see graph 4) is possibly due to the increase in egg-sharing 
schemes. The current upper age limit, set by the HFEA, for egg donors is 36 years of 
age, which may also be contributing to the increase in younger donors.  
Graph 4: The percentage of newly registered sperm and egg donors with and without children at the 
time of registering 1994-5, 2004-5 and 2013. (Source: HFEA 2014(d) and (g)).  
 
 
 
Internationally 
The UK is not alone in practicing open-identity donation. In 1985, Sweden became the 
first country to legislate for open-identity donation, and similar legislation followed in 
Austria, Switzerland, the Australian state of Victoria and the Netherlands (Frith 2001 
p819). In addition, countries such as New Zealand and the USA offer voluntary open-
identity programs. 
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Worldwide, there is some variation in when access to identifying information is 
granted: in Austria, DCO may access the information at 14 (HLC 2015), at 16 in the 
Netherlands (Janssens 2006 p852) and Western Australia (RTC 2013). In Western 
Australia the donor’s identity can be released to a DCO under 16 provided the donor 
and the recipient parent(s) consent. In New Zealand, the Family Court can authorise 
disclosure to a young person aged at least 16 as long as it is in the DCO’s best interests 
(DIA 2015). Sweden and Victoria have a ‘sufficient maturity’ test, rather than a precise 
chronological age – more in keeping with the idea that children develop the ability to 
make significant decisions as they mature, rather than at a set time point (SNCME 
2013, BDM 2015).  
 
Legislation, regulation, ethics and rights 
The use of donor gametes and embryos in the UK is legislated for by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, an amended version of the 1990 Act. The HFEA 
act as the regulatory body who ensure that legislation is adhered to, ethical standards 
of treatment and care are maintained and that the rights of all those involved in the 
process of gamete donation, be they donors, recipients or the DCO, are upheld. 
The rights of those involved in gamete donation are complex, interlinked and often 
competing but is important to understand them to be able to fully examine whether or 
not the rights of the DCO should be the ruling bioethical principle of the disclosure of 
information regarding gamete donation in the UK. 
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Chapter Two: Rights 
 
 
To understand why the DDIR is such an important and controversial piece of legislation 
it is necessary to understand not only the interests and rights on which it is based, but 
also the interplay of these interests and rights. Legislation involving gamete donation 
impacts on many different parties, each with competing, and potentially conflicting, 
rights of their own. It is important to understand not only what rights are per se but 
also to understand what the specific rights, of all the interested parties, are with 
respect to the DDIR. 
 
What are rights? 
Rights are justified claims to the protection of a person’s important interests (Gewirth 
1995 p776), and this is a protection which is owed to persons for their own sake.  
Rights mean different things in different situations and may be categorised in different 
ways. There are moral and legal rights and positive and negative rights. The 1948 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights contains security, due process, liberty, 
political, equality and social rights. The right-to-know does not fit neatly into one 
particular category, but instead encompasses due process, liberty and equality rights. 
Hohfield (cited in Gewirth 1995 p776) proposed four different meanings to ‘a right’: 
claims, liberties, powers and immunities. He considered claim-rights to be the most 
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important because they require a duty from others to not to interfere with a person 
having the object of their right, or a duty to actually assist them in having the object. In 
the case of the DDIR, DCO have a claim-right to know their donor’s identity and others 
(recipients, HFEA, etc.) have a duty not only to not prevent them from accessing this 
information but also to assist them in doing so. 
The right-to-know may also be described as a positive right, in that DCO can only 
exercise this right with the assistance of others. This is because DCO cannot begin the 
process of applying for identifying information unless they have been told of their 
origins. Similarly, the right-to-know can be said to involve “perfect duties”, which 
impose specific duties on identifiable people in relation to “the notion of justice, 
autonomy and perhaps also non-maleficence” (Almond 1994 p512). 
Rights carry more weight than an interest does, as having a right means that there is a 
strong justification for having one’s interest protected. MacCormick (1982 p154) 
explains having a right justified by the interests theory as “‘having one’s interests 
protected in certain ways by the imposition of (legal or moral) normative constraints 
on the acts and activities of other people with respect to the objects of one’s 
interests’”. The DCO’s interest in knowing their origins can be justified on two main 
grounds – an interest in knowing their familial medical history and a “psychological 
need for identity” (O’Donovan 1988 p29), and this justification under the interest 
theory gives weight to their right-to-know.  
The right-to-know means that DCO are personally entitled to information for their own 
sakes. Interestingly, if a utilitarian approach is taken to the justification of this claim-
right the outcome may be different. The DCO still has an interest in knowing their 
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donor’s identity but, after taking into account the impact of this knowledge and the 
interests of the donor, recipient(s) and other parties, this interest may not translate 
into a right. 
The DDIR re-enforces the DCO claim-right-to-know by making it a legal right. The right-
to-know is a justified legal right because the object of the right, the identifying 
information, is considered necessary for the freedom and well-being of the DCO.   
Rights are rarely stand-alone entities. In reality, rights are inextricably bound with 
duties, responsibilities and interests, especially in situations where the exercising of 
one person’s rights may violate the rights of another. In the case of gamete donation it 
is possible to identify the rights of all the parties involved but deciding whose rights 
take precedence is a balancing act, and there will always come a point where an 
individual’s rights should be infringed (Dancy 1993 p227). The difficulty comes in 
deciding how and why an individual’s rights should be infringed without denying equal 
moral status to another of the parties (Warren 1993 p303). Consideration must be 
given to the degree and importance of the good expected as a result of that right 
being exercised, whilst remembering that the “universality of human rights requires  
that each person act with due regard for other persons’ freedom and well-being as 
well as her own” (Gewirth 1995 p776). 
The DDIR is not the only piece of UK legislation that grants a legal right to information 
held by medical bodies. The Access to Medical Reports Act 1988 (1988 Chapter 28) 
allows individuals to access medical information about themselves held by medical 
practitioners. However, although this is a legal right, this can be denied if it is believed 
that it will cause serious harm to the physical or mental health of the patient or 
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someone else. The right to know information about ourselves is therefore clearly not 
an inalienable one. 
 
Where do they come from? 
The legal right-to-know evolved from an increasingly strong belief that we should be 
able to know our genetic identities. With advances in reproductive technology, genetic 
testing and changes in public attitudes towards the use of ART, and the resulting 
families, these moral beliefs gained sufficient strength to become legal rights. 
 
The rights of the DCO: the right-to-know 
A number of arguments have been put forward in support of the right-to-know one’s 
genetic origins. The two most common are that it is “essential to human wellbeing”  
and that “people have the right to the truth about their origins” (Frith 2001 p821). 
They are based on the idea that by not knowing our genetic origins we are being 
harmed and that we have a right to the truth about ourselves.  
 
The argument to tell to prevent harm 
Knowing their donor’s identity is believed to be in the DCO’s best interests because 
psychological wellbeing is “intimately connected to a sense of identity and heritage” 
(Brazier 2011 p371). Maclean and Maclean (1996 cited in Turkmendag et al 2008) 
20 
SMUC MA Bioethics and Medical Law 
Dissertation BML7013 
Regnum 125498 
argue that because disclosure of donor identity is in the DCO’s best interests, this must 
therefore override any desire for secrecy on the part of the recipient(s).  
Although it has been claimed that not knowing their genetic origins is harmful to DCO 
(Snowden and Mitchell 1981, Turner 1992, McWhinnie 1996 cited in Frith 2001 p821) 
there is little definitive research assessing the psychological impact of not knowing 
one’s genetic parents, either in adoptees or DCO. There is evidence that DCO, like 
adoptees, are often curious about their genetic parents and desire more information 
about their physical appearance and characteristics, but this in itself is not indicative 
that not knowing is harmful (Humphrey and Humphrey 1986 cited in Frith 2001 p821). 
Nevertheless, the DCO’s need for a connection to the donor, genetic or otherwise, 
should not be disregarded. Cohen (cited in Vanfraussen et al 2001 p2020) argues this 
connection is important for our sense of self because “hereditary links are used to  
establish one’s self-image and identity”. There is little evidence to support this and the 
argument is further undermined because, by 18 when DCO may seek identifying 
information, our personalities are already mostly formed. This is supported by Ruyter 
(1997 cited in Turkmendag et al 2008), who claims that while knowledge of genetic 
parents can contribute to the child’s inner development it is not essential.  
Although DCO have described feelings of incompleteness as a result of not knowing 
their genetic origins there is little evidence to show that receiving identifying 
information gives them the sense of completeness they lack (Turner and Coyle 2000 
pp.2047-2050, McWhinnie 2001 p812). The need-to-know for psychological well-being 
has been countered by Herring; “To encourage people to think that genetic links are 
important is to encourage an outdated idea of parenthood. Feelings of being 
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incomplete without knowledge of one’s genetic identity are social constructions and 
need to be challenged, not pampered” (Herring 2012 p383).  
Whilst many studies have looked at adoption, donor conception is harder to examine 
and is also not directly comparable to adoption (Shenfield 1994 p1350). DCO are 
usually genetically related to one recipient parent and do not encounter the same 
abandonment issues. Studies examining the potential harm done to DCO by not 
knowing their origins are further complicated by the fact that, despite the passing of 
the DDIR, few recipient parents tell their DCO of their origins.  
 
The right to the truth 
Irrespective of the issue of harm, it is argued that DCO have a right to be told the truth 
about their genetic origins, even if it is believed that the truth will not benefit them in 
any way. Warnock said “I cannot argue that children who are told of their origins, if 
they are AID children are necessarily happier, [sic] or better off in any way that can be 
estimated. But I do believe that if they are not told they are being wrongly treated” 
(Warnock 1987 p151). 
The BMA (2004 pp.288-9) comments that many naturally conceived children are not 
the children of those they believe to be their parents. Estimates vary but recent a 
systematic review puts this figure between 0.8 and 30%, with a median value of 3.7% 
(Bellis et al 2005 p749). As paternity tests are not widely available, and there is no 
obligation in the UK for mothers to name the child’s father on the birth certificate, “it 
cannot be argued that as a principle there is a general entitlement to know ones 
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parents” (BMA 2004 p289). With natural conceptions, the mother’s interests in 
keeping the father’s identity secret take precedence over the child’s interests in 
knowing his identity (Bellis et al 2005 p753). Nevertheless, knowing the donor’s 
identity can be important, and sharing this information, especially within the family, is 
important for openness and transparency. 
This is supported by O’Donovan (1988 p38), who argued that not telling the DCO of 
their origins cannot be justified as being in the child’s best interest: “The argument 
that the deceived would be better off not knowing, or would prefer not to know, runs  
into problems of lack of consent. There can be no consent in advance of lies about 
parenthood, for this would defeat the object. So the justification is advanced that the 
liar knows better than the victim what is good for the victim. This type of paternalistic 
argument, generally put forward in relation to persons of lesser capacity, is dangerous 
here. The child will develop into an adult.”  
Openness and honesty are clearly preferable. Secrecy and deception, as well as 
causing stress and anxiety within the family, undermine trust which is vital for stable 
and strong relationships. Studies have found that DCO discovering their origins has 
created feelings of mistrust within the family, of loss created by a lack of knowledge 
about their genetic identity, and frustration at not being able to discover more (Turner 
and Coyle 2000 p2041). McWhinnie (2001 p812) reports feelings of anguish, 
resentment, anger and a loss of a sense of identity and self, which are often more 
acute if the discovery has been accidental, rather than planned. It is not clear whether 
it is discovering that they are donor-conceived that causes these feelings, or whether it 
is the nature and timing of the discovery. Some DCO who have discovered their origins 
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reported feeling more concern over the impact that the prolonged secrecy and 
deception surrounding their conception has had on parental and family relationships, 
than about the fact that they were donor conceived. They have described the effect of 
the secrecy as “caustic”, “corrosive” and “detrimental” (Blyth 2012(b)). A lack of 
openness about their origins may also suggest to the DCO that their recipient parent(s) 
are ashamed of their origins, or even of them (HFEA 2012(d)). 
Preliminary studies reported by Snowdon and Snowdon (1983 cited in Gillon 1994 
p613) showed children do not react adversely to being told of their origins, provided 
the information is given in a purposeful and planned way. This is supported by Blyth’s 
assertion (2012(b)) that early disclosure avoids the need for deception and secrecy, 
and the effect they have on family relationships, and provides “an opportunity for 
offspring to affirm their parent’s choice of donor conception as a means of family 
building” (Blyth 2012(b)). 
When considering the importance of knowing ones genetic identity and origins, Lusk 
(1988 cited in Gillon 1994 p613) suggests it is more useful to think in terms of the 
resulting ‘adult’ than the resulting ‘child’. But it is still not clear whether what is best 
for the resulting ‘adult’ is more about preventing secrecy and deception within the 
family than a need to have identifying information. 
 
The legal basis of the right-to-know 
Article 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC 
1989) states the child has “as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his 
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or her parents.” In the context of gamete donation and DCO, ‘parent’ has been taken 
to mean the donor. However, the Convention does not define ‘parent’. A parent may 
be a genetic parent but in this day and age there is more to parenting and family 
structures than just genetics. In addition to genetic parents, the Education Act (1996  
Section 576) defines a parent as any person who, although not a genetic parent, has 
parental responsibility for a child or young person, or any person who has care of a 
child or young person. Thus it is not clear that Article 7 alone grants a right-to-know 
for the DCO. Additionally, the donor has no legal rights or responsibilities towards the 
DCO, and the DCO can make no legal claim on the donor. Yet invoking Article 7 in 
support of the DDIR may also invoke the right of the child to “be cared for by his or her 
parents” (UNCRC 1989), placing it in conflict with existing UK donor legislation. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1989(a)), which incorporates the European 
Convention on Human Rights, has also been cited in support of the DCO’s right-to-
know. Article 8, the right to respect for privacy and family life, is said to be 
contravened by any law prohibiting DCO from identifying their donors. In R (on the 
application of Rose and another) v Secretary of State for Health and another [2002] 3 
FCR 731 Scott Baker J concluded that “respect for private and family life requires that 
everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human 
beings. This includes their origins and the opportunity to understand them. It also 
embraces their physical and social identity and psychological integrity”. Being able to 
know one’s genetic identity is clearly important but identity is more than mere 
genetics; nurture may play just as important a role in shaping and developing physical 
and social identity and psychological integrity as nature. 
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Article 8 protects the right to respect for private and family life, prohibiting 
interference by a public authority except under certain conditions. One such condition 
is “for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (HRA 1989(b)) - “others” 
could conceivably mean the donor or recipient parent(s). The Human Rights Act does 
not define what is meant by family, and today’s families include more than purely 
genetic relations. In Re R ([2002]), Scott Baker J observed that “private and family life 
is a flexible and elastic concept incapable of precise definition”. It is also clear that the 
Human Rights Act recognises there may be conflict between the rights of family 
members – respecting privacy for one may mean violating it for another. 
Similarly it has been argued that maintaining donor anonymity contravenes Article 14, 
the prohibition of discrimination; maintaining donor anonymity means DCO are the 
only group of people legally prevented from discovering their genetic origins. 
Although these arguments are compelling it should be remembered that these 
conventions were not written with gamete donation in mind (Frith 2001 p821). Article 
7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 was originally developed following 
concern about stateless children and Article 8 of the Human Rights Act was a response 
to the abduction of babies at birth by the Argentinian military regime (Fortin 2009 
p345). They should therefore be applied to the debates regarding anonymous vs open-
identity donation and the right-to-know with some caution. 
In 2002 UK donor anonymity was challenged as a breach of Articles 8 and 14 of the 
Human Rights Act.  In Re R ([2002]) the claimants were seeking access to non-
identifying donor information. The court held that Article 8 was engaged: “respect for 
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private and family life incorporated the concept of personal identity and everyone 
should be able to establish details of his/her identity as a human being. This included 
the right to obtain certain information about a biological parent who would inevitably 
have contributed to the identity of his/her child.” Scott Baker J went on to conclude 
that the distinction between identifying and non-identifying information was not 
relevant to whether or not Article 8 is engaged but that the distinction is relevant to 
the “balancing exercise of the other considerations in art 8(2)” (Re R [2002]). It is the 
balance between article 8(1) and (2) that is crucial when discussing the DCO’s right-to-
know and the rights of the other interested parties.    
McWhinnie (1988 cited in Gillon 1994 p613) argues that donor anonymity, in addition 
to preventing DCO from knowing their genetic identity, also denies them chance to 
access their identity as it appears in official registers. Whilst undoubtedly true, the 
situation is little improved post-DDIR introduction. There is currently no UK legislation 
that ensures DCO are told of their origins, and open donation alone does not appear to 
be sufficient to ensure that DCO are able to access their genetic identities. Although 
the DDIR places a positive obligation on the state to assist DCO in identifying their 
donors it falls “short of providing an unequivocal right to a donor-conceived person to 
learn the identity of his or her donor.” (Blyth 2012(a) p311).  
How to ensure DCO are told of their origins, and can therefore exercise their right-to-
know, has often been debated and, as yet, no satisfactory solution has been found. In 
August 2007, the Joint Committee on the (Draft) Human Tissue and Embryo Bill 
debated whether a legal right to be told was needed. Arguments in favour included 
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that as the state was involved in assisted conception, it should not be actively involved 
in deception, although it may be argued that any deception is practiced by the 
recipient parents rather than the state. Many witnesses believed openness, honesty 
and early disclosure should be encouraged but not legislated for, and some argued 
legislation would infringe recipient parents’ reproductive and parental autonomy and 
responsibility (Joint Committee 2007 paragraph.269-271). The Government rejected 
the Joint Committee’s recommendation to put ‘By donor’ on the DCO’s birth 
certificate but agreed to keep the matter under review (Joint Committee on Human 
Rights 2008 pp.57-58). 
A further balance must be found between the right-to-know of as yet unborn DCO and 
the potential effect of the DDIR on donor numbers. Although statistics now suggest 
that the DDIR has not adversely affected donor numbers there is still a shortage of 
donors, and it is not known if more donors would be available if a parallel anonymous 
system was also available. If this is the case, Campbell (2006) argues that the “net 
effect of the policy is that children who would otherwise have come into existence do 
not now do so because donors cannot be found”. These children cannot exercise their 
right-to-know because the very presence of their right may cause them, directly or 
indirectly, not to be born. 
Whilst it is often argued that children have a right not to be deceived about their 
genetic origins, the fact that the truth can be damaging or traumatic is often 
overlooked. Open-identity donation is potential harmful to DCO, as well as to the 
donor, recipient(s) and wider family, and their interests and rights should not be 
overlooked. 
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The rights of the donor 
It could be argued that donors have a right under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act to 
maintain their anonymity to protect their private and family life. However, given that 
gamete donation is a voluntary act and donors consent to the holding and releasing of 
identifying information by the HFEA this argument is weak. It would perhaps have 
more weight if it was proposed that the DDIR had been applied retrospectively (a 
challenge that could be mounted under the Human Rights Act 1990), or if it were 
suggested that donors be obliged to reciprocate contact with DCO. 
There is a marked disparity in the amount and type of information that DCO can access 
and the amount that the donor can. An argument can be made that it is important for 
the donor’s psychological well-being to discover the identity of, and have the chance 
of contact with, the DCO. Donors often report thinking about the offspring born as a 
result of their donation, and of a desire to know more about them (Jadva et al 2011 
pp.641-642). 
The legal rights of the donor, provided they have donated through a HFEA licenced 
clinic, are clear. Sperm donors are not the legal parent of the DCO, have no legal 
obligation towards them, are not named on the birth certificate, have no parental 
rights and cannot be asked to support the DCO financially. The situation is even more 
straightforward for egg donors: the birth mother is considered the legal mother of the 
DCO, even if she has conceived using a donated egg. The DCO’s legal father, or second 
parent, is the birth mother’s husband, provided he has consented to treatment, or the 
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birth mother’s partner, provided they are named on the ‘Consent to Parenthood’ 
forms. The legal rights of the genetic parents of donated embryos are less 
straightforward, and the legal parents of the embryo are determined by the HFE ACT 
1990. The use of donated sperm by single women is also a grey area. The birth mother 
is the legal mother but the donor could be considered the legal father (HFEA 2012(b)). 
 
The rights of the recipient(s) 
Very few, if any, recipients will use donated gametes with the intention of the donor 
becoming a ‘parent’ to their child. They are far more likely to view the donated 
gametes as having been donated to allow them to become parents and have a family 
of their own; as a means to an end, with the donor as the facilitator of the process. 
The possibility that DCO could discover the truth about their origins may be unsettling 
for many recipient parents; they may even perceive contact, and a possible 
relationship, with the donor as a threat to themselves and their family. The donor may 
be happy with their role as donor and not wish for involvement as a parent but this is 
not always the case. Open-identity donation creates the potential for damage to 
family relationships, especially the relationship between the recipient father and DCO 
(Roberts 2000 cited in Herring 2012 p382). 
It has been argued the recipient parent(s) also have a right to privacy and respect for 
their family life and as such should not be compelled to tell the DCO of their origins if 
they choose not to (Walker 1999 cited in Frith 2001 p822). Although accessing donor 
information may be positive for the DCO, maintaining family privacy and protecting 
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the family “from interference by a third party” (Vanfraussen et al 2001 p2023) may 
also be beneficial for the DCO. The recipient parent(s) are autonomous, making their 
own reproductive decisions and exercising their parental rights in how they choose to 
raise the DCO. In choosing not to tell, there is a conflict between the DCO’s right-to-
know and the interests/rights of the recipient parent(s). This is further complicated by 
the fact that they may choose not to tell because they do not consider that doing so is 
in the best interests of the child. Although children are acknowledged and accepted as 
rights-holders, they are able to exercise relatively few rights independently and are 
dependent on the decisions of parents/guardians for the protection and upholding of 
many more.  
In 2006, Professor Sir Colin Campbell, founding chair of the HFEA (1990-1994) called 
for the restoration of sperm donor anonymity, in effect reversing the DDIR. 
Irrespective of the effect on donor numbers, he argued that the DDIR gave the 
“putative interests” of a person not yet conceived greater weight than the “legitimate 
interests” of the would-be parents (Campbell 2006).   
 
The rights of others 
The families of DCO do not consist simply of the DCO, recipient parent(s) and the 
donor. There are wider family members who may be affected by both the donation 
and by subsequent potential contact between DCO and donor, and their interests and 
rights are important too.  
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Although recipient (i.e. non-donor) grandparents have no direct legal right to contact 
with their grandchildren, they can apply to court to make an application to see them 
under a Court Order (Davies 2010). Contact with grandparents is often held to be 
beneficial children (see Re W (A minor) (Contact: Application by Grandparent) [1997] 2 
FCR 643) and Re C (art 8 order: grandparents’ application for leave) [2003] NIFam 13 
Family Division). As yet, donor grandparents and other donor family members have no 
legal right to contact with the DCO, and as DCO-donor contact can only occur once the 
DCO reaches 18 this is unlikely to change soon.  
The interests of other family members may also extend into the future. There may be 
a time when donors, for example, seek a legal recourse to have contact with the 
children of their DCO, their genetic grandchildren. Conversely, Blyth (2012(a) p313) 
postulates that the “…..descendants of a donor-conceived person may have an interest 
in knowing the identity of their parent’s donor, an interest that may not be realised if 
their parent has not sought this information for him or her self – possibly because they 
were not interested in accessing this information for themselves or were unaware of 
their status and/or the existence of this information.” Similar cases involving the 
descendants of adopted children have already occurred. In Re X (Adopted Child: Access 
to Court File) [2014] EWFC 33, the daughter of the adopted person successfully applied 
to the court for information about her genetic grandmother. What weight, if any, 
should be given to their interests and rights? Would the right-to-know pass down to 
the DCO’s genetic descendants? If knowing one’s genetic origins is so important, 
descendants of DCO could presumably also mount a legal challenge under Articles 8 
and 14 of the Human Rights Act. 
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A comparison with adoption 
Since 1976 adopted children, from the age of 18, have had the legal right to access 
their original birth certificate (Adoption Act 1976 Section 51). The Adoption and 
Children Act (2002 Section 60) gives an adopted child the right to access any available 
information about themselves, unless the High Court orders otherwise.  
The importance for adopted people of having information about themselves and their 
background has long been recognised. In 2001, Scott Baker J found that “many 
adopted people wish to have information about their history and background 
including the reasons for their adoption. Many find it important to have a complete 
personal history in order to develop a positive sense of identity” (Re Gunn-Russo v 
Nugent Care Society and another [2001] EWHC Admin 556). Now, those involved in 
adoption are encouraged to participate in life story work. This is a method of recording 
significant information and events for adopted children to help them know and 
understand their past (Be My Parent 2012(a)). It includes descriptions of their birth 
families, information on their place of birth, significant people in their lives and their 
care history to help adopted children understand their origins and develop a sense of 
identity (Be My Parent 2012(a)). Additionally, there may be direct or indirect contact 
between the birth family and adopted child. Whilst this does not happen in all cases, it 
is recognised that some form of contact may be beneficial to the child. This is 
undertaken on a voluntary basis and although it may be recommended by social 
workers or the court there is no legal obligation by the adoptive parent(s) to agree (Be 
My Parent 2012(b)).   
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There are clearly differences between adoption and donor conception. Life story work 
is not used for DCO, possibly because the nature of the conception, pregnancy and 
birth make it easier to conceal the child’s origins. The DCO is usually genetically related 
to one recipient parent and, as they are born into the recipient family, all their 
significant events and people are known to the recipient family, and to them. The only 
exception to this, should the recipient parent(s) choose not to disclose, is information 
about their conception and about their donor. Available information about the donor 
may be limited, especially if the donor has only completed a basic profile.  
There are also significant differences between donors and birth parents. A donor is 
defined as a giver or contributor (The Free Dictionary); a person donating gametes 
facilitates others to become parents and have a family. Birth parents are not donors.  
They do not have children with the intention of relinquishing them to allow others to 
be parents. A donor may view their involvement as complete once the donation has 
been made, neither requiring nor expecting any further involvement, whereas birth 
parents may always view themselves as parents. 
Where the two scenarios are similar is in that although both DCO and adopted 
children have a legal right to access information about their genetic identities once 
they reach 18, there is no legal requirement for them to be told about their origins. As 
with donor-conception, there is strong guidance from the British Association for 
Adoption and Fostering that children should be raised knowing that they are adopted, 
and that this information should be given from a young age and in an appropriate 
manner (BAAF 2014). Disclosure may be difficult in both adoption and donor-
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conception but it is important because without it, neither group can exercise their 
right-to-know.  
Although experience from adoption regarding how and when to disclose information 
may be helpful it is not often used. Turkmendag et al (2008) emphasize that “adoption 
is a substitute for procreation whereas donor conception is a form of procreation: the 
act has its own integrity and completeness – it is the would-be parent(s)’ act and the 
child is unquestionably their child”. With donor conception, one recipient parent is 
usually genetically related to the DCO, there is a visible pregnancy and no obvious 
infertility, and “the donation [is] of gametes rather than giving up one’s child” (Scheib 
et al 2003 p1125). This is especially true for heterosexual couples, where the presence 
of a father means conception origins are less likely to be questioned.  
Despite the differences between adoption and donor-conception, much of the 
evidence on the harm caused by secrecy (Shenfield and Steel 1997 p392) and the 
importance for a child to know his/her origins (Almack 2006 p7) is drawn from the 
literature on adoption. 
There are also differences between DCO and adopted children in terms of the medical 
history of their donor/birth parent that they can access. Donors must inform the HFEA 
of any medical conditions, or family history of such conditions, prior to donation (HFEA 
2012(b)) whereas adopted children rely on the Adoption Registration Service GP to GP 
service (HSCIC), which passes relevant hereditary information between the GP’s of the 
birth parent and adopted child, provided the birth parent can be traced. Thus adopted 
children, and their adopted parents, have far less information than the DCO. 
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It is worth noting that while Article 8 of the Human Rights Act can be invoked in 
support of the right-to-know for both DCO and adopted children, on the basis that 
knowing their genetic origins is important for their sense of identity and psychological 
wellbeing, there is no corresponding right for either the gamete donors or birth 
parent(s). It is difficult to argue that knowing their biological child is important for their 
own genetic identity but the argument that they have a similar right-to-know for their 
sense of self and wellbeing is much stronger. In fact, Article 14 is often invoked in 
support of the right-to-know for DCO and adopted children because it would be 
discriminatory to deny them a legal right to know their genetic origins and family, 
under Article 8. But is it not similarly discriminatory to prevent donors and birth 
parents from having any legal right to identify and contact their children? Currently, 
birth parents wishing to contact their genetic children must join the Adoption Contact 
Register. This is a voluntary contact register administered by the Registrar General, 
which facilitates contact between the adopted child and birth parents, once the 
adopted child reaches 18 and only if they wish to contact their birth relatives 
(Adoption Act 1976). Donors wishing to contact their DCO may register with the HFEA 
or organisations such as the Donor Conceived Register, but again contact is voluntary 
and can only occur once the DCO reaches 18.  
 
Translating rights into reality 
Despite clear and unambiguous legislation as detailed by the DDIR it is evident that in 
practice the situation is more complicated. The same arguments that are often cited in 
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support of the DCO’s right-to-know can also be cited in support of opposing rights of 
the donor or recipient parent(s). In order to understand how and why and whether 
these rights are translated into reality it is necessary to look in more detail at the DCO, 
donor, recipient parent(s) and their respective families. 
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Chapter Three: The Donor-Conceived-Offspring 
 
 
The concept of family 
Using donor gametes to conceive a child challenges previously held ideas of family and 
personal identity (BMA 2004 p269). Genetically, the child is only related to one (or 
possibly none) of the recipient parent(s), yet socially, emotionally and legally the 
recipient parent(s) are considered the parents. The child is born to them, and raised 
and nurtured by them. Although a genetic parent, the donor has no legal responsibility 
towards the child and, in the vast majority of cases, no emotional or social contact or 
responsibility either (see Appendix 1 for a hypothetical case study illustrating the 
complex links between DCO, recipient parent(s), donor and their respective families). 
There are numerous reasons why gamete donors choose to donate and a wide variety 
in how donors view their DCO. Whilst some donors consider themselves to be parents 
to their DCO many do not: “‘…this was me providing a service to other people who 
would be parents’…. ‘I’m not a parent. I would never consider that I was any sort of 
parent, but certainly I’ve got a role in their life just letting them know what their 
genetic heritage is’” (Kirkman et al 2014 p735). 
For DCO, learning of their origins may threaten their existing identity (Turner and 
Coyle 2000 p2042) and this may be felt more acutely with the accompanying 
knowledge that they can identify their donor. 
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The welfare of the child 
Both the HFE Act 1990 (1990(a)) and the HFEA Code of Practice (2014(c)) contain 
requirements to consider the welfare of the child, where ‘the child’ is taken to mean 
the child born as a result of the donation or procedure.  
 
The ‘need for a father’ 
Under the HFE Act 1990 (1990(a)), clinics must consider the “welfare of any child who 
may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child for a father) 
and of any other child who may be affected by the birth”. In 2008, the ‘need for a 
father’ was replaced by “the need of that child for supportive parenting”, to reflect the 
changing nature of the family (HFE Act 2008) whilst maintaining the emphasis on a 
supportive family environment. 
 
Informing DCO of their origins 
Until 2003, the HFEA Code of Practice (2003 p31) made specific reference to the need 
to consider, within the assessment of the welfare of the child, 
“(i) A child’s potential need to know about their origins and whether or not the 
prospective parents are prepared for the questions which may arise while the child is 
growing up 
(ii) Family attitudes towards such a child 
39 
SMUC MA Bioethics and Medical Law 
Dissertation BML7013 
Regnum 125498 
(iii) Implications which may arise if the donor is known within the child’s family or 
social circle.” 
The introduction of the DDIR, which recognised in law the right of the DCO to know 
their genetic identity, necessitated a change in the Code of Practice. These 
considerations are no longer listed but the most recent Code (HFEA 2014(c)) does 
detail when and how non-identifying and identifying information may be obtained, as 
well as recommendations that DCO are told of their origins early in childhood. It also 
stipulates that those seeking treatment with donated gametes should be made aware 
before treatment that questions surrounding their child’s origins may arise and that 
they should be encouraged to be open with their children from an early age (HFEA 
2014(c) p168). 
The Code no longer includes specific reference to the need to consider the attitude of 
the family, or the implications of the donor being known to the family. This raises a 
number of interesting issues that the HFEA have not been able or willing to clarify. It is 
possibly because it is hoped that the increasingly accepting societal attitude towards 
gamete donation is leading to recipient parents becoming more open about their use 
of donated gametes with family and friends.  
 
‘Any other child’ 
The phrase ‘any other child’ is frequently used throughout the HFE Act 1990 and the 
Code of Practice. It is not defined but is commonly taken to mean ‘any other child of 
the recipient’s family’.  
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Prior to the introduction of the DDIR, these were the only other children likely to be 
affected by the use of donor gametes, but following the introduction of the DDIR the 
donor’s naturally born children may also be affected. They may find themselves faced 
with half-siblings they were previously unaware of, and the effect on their welfare 
(especially if they are still children when the DCO makes contact) may be considerable.  
It is therefore not unreasonable to challenge the Code of Practice’s assertion that 
welfare of the child assessments do not need to be carried out on gamete donors 
(HFEA 2014(c) p77) or to suggest that greater information and support should be given 
to potential donors about the effect on their existing or future children. Now that the 
DDIR has created a conduit for DCO-donor contact “any other child who may be 
affected by the birth” (HFE Act 1990(a), HFEA 2014(c) p77) must surely include the 
donor’s own children. 
 
Open-identity donation 
Given the detailed health information potential donors must provide to the HFEA, 
accessing knowledge of one’s genetic background for health reasons fails as an 
argument for open-identity donation. The main benefit of open-identity donation 
appears to be to allow the DCO to have increased knowledge about their genetic 
background and identity. 
Many DCO studies have revealed that common reactions to discovering their origins 
include curiosity, interest and a desire to know more about the donor’s physical 
characteristics, personality traits and interests (Rumball and Adair 1999 p1396, 
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Vanfraussen et al 2001 pp.2021-2022; Snowdon 1990, Lindblad et al 2000 cited in 
Lycett et al 2005 p811). Open-identity donation gives recipient parents more 
information to give to the DCO, avoiding the sense of “futility” for parents and DCO 
that may result from having incomplete knowledge about the child’s origins (Cook at al 
1995(a) p553, Daniels et al 1995 p1214, Vanfraussen et al 2001 p2021; Snowdon et al 
1983, Baran and Panor 1993, Brewaeys 1996, Lindblad et al 2000 cited in Scheib 2003 
p1116). 
Studies examining how children respond to learning of their DI origins have reported 
the experience as neutral to positive for the children and recipient parents concerned 
(Rumball and Adair 1999 p1396, Vanfraussen et al 2001 p2022, Lindblad et al 2000 
cited in Scheib et al 2003 p1117). Scheib et al (2005 p243) reported that disclosure of 
their origins had a neutral to positive effect on relationships between the DCO and 
recipient parent(s). DCO felt comfortable having a donor and many reported that it did 
not affect their lives or their security within their families, although there was 
considerable variation in their openness to discussing having a donor.  
The same study found that DCO felt somewhat positive about their donors and that 
for 86% their “overwhelming feeling was curiosity about the donor”, with over 50% 
feeling appreciative towards their donor. Over 82% of DCO wanted contact to get 
more information about their donor (Scheib et al 2005 pp.244-247) with only 50% 
wanting contact to form a relationship. Of those, 50% wanted a friendly relationship 
and only 11% wanted a parent-child relationship. This curiosity about the donor 
supports Hewitt’s (2002 p19) findings that DCO are “interested in knowing their donor 
as a person, a fellow human being”, and Vanfraussen et al’s finding that contact with 
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the donor allows the DCO to learn more about themselves and increase their sense of 
identity (Vanfraussen et al 2003 – cited in Scheib et al 2005 p248).  
Around 30% felt anxious about meeting their donor, with a similar number feeling 
excited, and significantly only 10% felt the donor was an important person in their life 
(Scheib et al 2005 p244). This is possibly because “social links are established between 
the procreator and the child, not with the donor” (Turkmendag et al 2008). This is 
supported by Scheib et al’s findings (2005 p245) that 76% of DCO described their ideal 
donor using positive character or physical traits, and only 44% described the donor by 
the positive interactions they would have with the DCO. Scheib concluded that DCO 
were “mostly hoping for a donor who was simply a good, open-minded person, who 
would be open to contact and not necessarily be heavily involved in their life” (Scheib 
et al 2005 p245). Similarly, Siegels et al (2008 p239) found that the DCO’s relationship 
with their recipient parent(s) was far important to them than the method of their 
conception.  
Scheib et al (2005 p247) also examined DCO plans for donor identity-release, and 
found that 86% of DCO were at least moderately likely to request their donor’s 
identity, but there was considerable variation in when they felt they would do this, 
with only 55% who thought they would do so at the age of 18. Although requesting 
identifying information does not necessarily lead to contact, 82% thought that they 
would be moderately likely to attempt contact (55% at the age of 18). Of the DCO 
questioned for the study the majority hoped they would be able to make initial 
contact indirectly via the sperm bank (60%) or by letter or email, perhaps to help 
protect themselves from a negative outcome of attempting contact.  
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Nearly 80% of DCO were interested in the donors’ feelings about being contacted, 
perhaps demonstrating an understanding of the impact contact can have on donors 
too. They reported being concerned about respecting the donors’ privacy and not 
wanting to intrude on their private lives. 
 
Can the truth be harmful? 
It is assumed that DCO need to know their donors identity, and possibly to form a 
relationship of some kind, because this is believed to be best for the DCO. But what if 
the relationship is not a positive one? The donor may reject attempts at contact or 
contact may be difficult, creating an awkward and strained relationship. Can this sort 
of relationship be said to be in anyone’s best interests, let alone the DCO’s? A study by 
Carsten (2000) of adoptees searching for their genetic parents found the meetings did 
not always result in an instant bond or deep recognition and many became 
insignificant, showing that whilst the desire to know is strong the desire to start or 
maintain a relationship is less so.  
Many recipient parents have expressed concern and anxiety over whether the donor 
would meet the DCO’s expectations or, in families with more than one DCO, they have 
expressed concern over the effect on the other children, who may not have donors 
willing to reciprocate contact (Scheib et al 2003 p1119-1120).  
Little has been said about the possibility that being contacted by their DCO may be 
harmful for the donors, but given that the majority of donors cited wanting to help 
others a main reason to donate and that only 14% viewed their relationship with the  
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DCO as a parental one (Jadva et al 2011 pp.641-2) it is reasonable to assume that 
being identified and contacted by their DCO will create some conflicting emotions for 
donors too. 
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Chapter Four: The Donor 
 
 
The role of the donor is vital – without them, recipients would be unable to fulfil their 
desire to become parents. The donor helps to create a child and a family about which 
they will be given little information and no responsibility. This can be difficult for 
donors, especially as there is a strong social sense of responsibility towards one’s 
offspring in many societies (Daniels 1986 cited in Gillon 1994 p611). Donors have 
reported feeling concern about their DCO and the life they will have (Jadva et al 2011 
p641, Gallagher 2014). Although donors have no legal responsibilities towards the DCO 
they may feel they have a moral responsibility for them (Jadva et al 2011 p644).  
Donors also differ in how they perceive their relationship to the DCO. Many don’t view 
themselves as parents, instead believing that “the parent is the person who brings 
them [the DCO] up” (Gallagher 2014). Some view their relationship as that of a good 
friend or family member but others consider they have a parental role, regarding the 
DCO as their own child (Jadva et al 2011 p642). This is countered by Wallbank (2004 
p260), who argues that “to contribute one’s genes to the creation of a child is not 
congruent with the social role of parenthood”.  
Although the average age of donors has increased, the majority do not yet have 
children of their own (HFEA(d) – net.2015) and may not feel that they are ready to 
become parents – “at my age now I don’t know I would be a good parent” (Gallagher 
2014). 
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Why do donors donate? 
There are many reasons why people choose to donate their gametes: a desire to act 
altruistically to help others to become parents (either those known to the donor or 
strangers), a wish to ensure their own DNA is carried on or to confirm their fertility, 
financial motivation (payment for donation or donating in return for subsidised fertility 
treatment) (Jadva et al 2011 p641). 
In the UK, the HFEA prohibits payment for donation, but does allow the payment of 
compensation. Sperm donors receive £35 per clinic visit and egg donors receive £750 
per cycle, and both have the provision to claim an excess to cover higher expenses 
(travel, accommodation, childcare) (HFEA 2012(c), 2014(a) – net.2015). 
 
Egg donors and egg-sharing 
A number of egg donors now donate through egg-sharing schemes. In return for 
donating, the cost of their own treatment is subsidised. Although a practical solution 
for many women, this has implications for the voluntary nature of their donation and 
for their possible attitudes towards the DCO. It is not unreasonable to ask how 
voluntary their donation really is given that the eggs are ‘donated’ in return for 
discounted treatment, a payment-in-kind. It is also not unreasonable to ask if these 
women feel coerced or pressurised into donating when they otherwise would not 
have. 
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If their fertility treatment is unsuccessful, they may have conflicting feelings towards 
the DCO, and recipient family, which is unlikely to produce a positive, heathy 
relationship between DCO, donor and their respective families.  
 
Counselling 
Donors need information and counselling about the implications of their donation, and 
this is even more relevant for those donating under the DDIR who may be identified 
and contacted by their offspring in the future. 
It was previously believed that it was in the donors’ best interests to dissociate 
themselves from the consequences of their donation but this practice was ethically 
questionable, even before the introduction of the DDIR. Gillon (1994 p611) argues that 
it is unethical to ask donors to consent to donation “without giving adequate 
consideration of the consequences”. He also comments that gamete donation has 
implications for the donor’s family too, as the donation may result in new family 
members they know nothing about. The donor may be able to dissociate themselves 
from the consequences of donation but this may not be as easy for other family 
members, in particular adolescent children, for whom this may be profoundly 
disturbing (Gillon 1994 p611). 
There is currently only a requirement that “adequate” counselling be offered to 
donors – there is no obligation for them to accept it (NGDT 2012). The HFEA offers 
some counselling support to those wishing to re-register as identifiable donors but it is 
not clear if this support will continue to be available to donors whose DCO are part of 
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the first cohort born after the introduction of the DDIR (HFEA 2015(b)). There may well 
be a need in the future for donors to receive counselling around the time their DCO 
reach 18. 
 
The effect of the DDIR 
A study (Murray and Golombok 2000 p2138) of licenced fertility clinics gave the 
removal of anonymity as a significant deterrent to potential donors, especially 
younger, childless donors, and this was used as one of the main arguments against the 
introduction of the DDIR. There was also concern that the number of donors from 
ethnic minorities would be greatly reduced. 
However, figures from the HFEA (2013(b)) show that although there was a decrease in 
new donor registrations around the time the DDIR was introduced, the number of new 
sperm and egg donors registered in 2010 was at an all-time high. Overall, the number 
of women treated with donor insemination has been steadily falling since 1992 (HFEA  
2013(c)), possibly due to an increase in the use of ICSI, and the number of patients 
undergoing IVF/ICSI with donated gametes has also decreased since 2001. This may be 
due to improvements in assisted reproduction techniques reducing the need for 
donated gametes, a decrease in the availability of suitable gametes (e.g. ethnically 
matched gametes) or a decrease in the number of patients choosing to use donated 
gametes. 
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The biggest effect of the DDIR will be the chance for identification of and contact with 
donors by DCO. As yet, no DCO born after the introduction of the DDIR have reached 
18 so the full impact of this legislation cannot be assessed. 
 
Contact 
Following the introduction of the DDIR, all newly registered UK gamete donors are 
open-identity donors, which is made clear at the time of donation. It is reasonable to 
assume that they are at least open to being contacted by their adult DCO in the future, 
even if they do not wish to reciprocate. The amount of interaction is harder to predict, 
as is the impact on the donors’ families, but Scheib et al (2005 p249) found that 
donors were positive about forthcoming identity-release and were curious about the 
DCO. Jadva et al (2011 p642) found that while donors may welcome contact from the 
DCO they felt it was for the DCO to initiate, possibly reflecting their own view of 
themselves as a donor rather than a parent.  
A small number of Danish open-identity sperm donors were interviewed about their 
motivation to donate and their views on future contact with their DCO (Russell 2015 
pp.30-35). The donors, despite receiving a small payment per donation, generally 
regarded their main reason for donating as altruistic, as helping people who couldn’t 
have children and giving them the chance to become parents. However, one career-
driven donor also “[regarded] being a donor as ‘insurance’ that my genes carry on”. 
The donors believed that being identifiable was important, that “every child has a right 
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to know who their donor is” and one donor described how he would feel “cheated” if 
he was denied the opportunity to find out who his biological father was. 
Some thought had been given to the possibility of being contacted by their DCO, once 
the DCO reached 18, but the general feeling was that it was a long way off. They were 
open to the idea of being contacted but most felt contact would be limited, perhaps a 
phone call or exchange of basic information. Only one donor articulated concern about 
how his partner might feel, the same donor who expressed a desire not to want to 
“get between a donor child and the dad who raised them”. Interestingly, the feeling of 
being overwhelmed, and of possible regret, was also mentioned in relation to contact, 
indicating that this can be an intensely emotional topic for donors too. 
As well as being intensely emotional for donors, the prospect that the DCO may 
identify, contact and possibly form a relationship with their donor produces many 
conflicting emotions for recipient parent(s). Whilst some may be open to the idea of 
contact between the DCO and donor, others may see it as a threat to their family, 
much wanted child and possibly to their very identity as parents. 
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Chapter Five: The Recipient Parent(s) 
 
 
The decision to use donor gametes is not one which is taken lightly. It allows recipients 
to become parents and to have “their identity in society enhanced and confirmed by 
their role in the family unit” (Warnock 1984 p8). The use of donor gametes has 
“profound social and psychological implications” as the recipient parent(s) must come 
to terms with the fact they have no genetic link to their child, despite having a 
nurturing and social one.  Accordingly, the HFE Act (1990 (b)) stipulates that people 
seeking treatment using donated gametes and those seeking to donate should “be 
given a suitable opportunity to receive proper counselling” about the personal and 
social implications of their actions. 
 
To tell or not to tell 
Despite a number of countries worldwide adopting open-identity donation, the 
number of recipient parents who choose not to tell their children of their origins is 
high, at around 75%. The impact of removing donor anonymity is therefore likely to be 
limited. 
The decision to tell is left to the recipient parent(s). Some plan to tell when the 
children are older but many have no intention of doing so. The process of making the 
decision to disclose is complex, involving “an interaction between physiological states 
of the parents and the social, cultural and familial context within which this decision 
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must be negotiated” (Nachtigall et al 1997 p89). The decision is influenced by the 
recipient parent(s) beliefs, expectations and experiences. 
In one European study (Golombok et al 2002(a) pp.836-7) around 70% of parents had 
decided not to tell. Their reasons included: 
1) The desire to protect the child from distressing information 
2) Concern about the impact on family relationships, especially the father-DCO 
relationship 
3) A desire to protect the father, and to a lesser extent, the mother 
4) Fear about possible negative reactions of others 
5) A belief that there was no need to tell. 
In the UK disclosure figures are even lower, with one study showing that only 5% of DI 
recipients had told their near-adolescent children (Golombok et al 2002(a) p836). A 
subsequent study (Golombok et al 2006 p1921) found that despite greater 
encouragement towards disclosure, less than 8% of oocyte recipients and less than 5% 
of DI recipients had begun to tell their child by the time of the child’s third birthday. 
This is in marked contrast to a previous study (Golombok et al 2004 p448) which found 
that 50% of recipients planned to tell their child by the time of their 5th birthday. 
Clearly, the intention to disclose does not always translate into action. 
Recipient parents may find it easier to tell their child of their DI origins than to reveal 
the donor’s identity, indicating that it is concerns over revealing the donor’s identity, 
rather than acknowledging the DI, that is problematic. Lalos et al (2007 p1759) found 
that among the recipient parents who had disclosed the DI to their children, less than 
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two thirds had also told them about their right to obtain identifying donor 
information. 
The subject of genetic origins and the use of a donor is not easy to broach and many 
recipient parents may simply choose to avoid the issue altogether (Lycett et al 2005 
p811). Additionally, finding an appropriate time to tell may be difficult, especially for 
heterosexual couples where there is already a parent of each sex present within the 
family. 
By not telling, recipient parents may believe that they are protecting their family, 
preventing the DCO from developing an emotional relationship with the donor that 
may threaten the integrity of the family (Gillon 1994 p613). Recipient parents may fear 
the DCO will reject them, or that the DCO may be rejected or treated differently by 
other family members if the truth is known. 
Leaving the decision to tell to the recipient parents seems far from satisfactory. Frith 
(2001 p822) argues that “if it is felt that knowledge of one’s genetic inheritance is 
indeed a fundamental right then it might seem unsatisfactory to leave such a decision 
solely to the parent’s discretion”. Open-identity donation systems, such as that 
legislated by the DDIR, can only succeed where the DCO are told of their origins  
(Shenfield and Steel 1997 pp.393-394). In support of this, the Warnock Report 
recommended that ‘by donation’ be added to the birth certificates of DCO, so that 
they could discover the circumstances of their conception, independently of their 
parents if necessary (Warnock 1985 pp26 and 38). The recommendation was defeated 
as it was thought it would cause the DCO unnecessary embarrassment (Morgan and 
Lee 1990 cited in Frith 2001 p822). 
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A Dutch study examining the reasons behind recipient parents choosing anonymous or 
open donors found that the major motive for heterosexual couples choosing an 
anonymous donor was fear of interference from the donor in their lives. In this study 
this was felt more by men than women, who were afraid the donor would “negatively 
influence the child’s love for them as social fathers” (Breaeys et al 2005 p822). 
Concerns about the impact of telling on the recipient father-DCO relationship are 
often raised, and these concerns still remain for recipient parents who have told the 
DCO of their origins (Hunter et al 2000 cited in Breaeys et al 2005 p823). Scheib et al 
(2003 p1121) found the response of family and friends to the disclosure that recipient 
parents had used open-identity DI was neutral to moderately positive, suggesting that 
attitudes towards DI are changing and that concerns around open-identity donation 
are less to do with keeping the use of DI secret and more to do with reducing the risk 
of interference from the donor into family life. 
Conversely, open-identity donation in places like the USA is increasingly popular. It 
gives recipient parents more information about the donor, both for themselves and to 
give to the DCO, and DCO have the option of identifying and possibly meeting their 
donor in the future (Raboy 1993, Cordray 2000, Scheib et al 2000 cited in Scheib et al 
2003 p1115). A 2003 study of open-identity donation recipients found that over 80% 
chose open-identity donation because they believed it was the right thing to do and 
they wanted their child to be able to access donor information (Scheib et al 2003 
p1119). In the same study, recipient parents reported that disclosing had a positive 
impact on their relationship with their child, creating a “sense of trust in the child”. 
DCO who learn about their origins before adulthood show less resentment towards 
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their family, although the desire and need to know more about their donor remains 
(Franz and Allen 2001, Blyth 2002, Shanner and Harris 2002, Lorbach 2003 cited in 
Scheib et al 2005 p240). 
Having access to more donor information, including identifying information, may make 
it easier for recipient parents to tell their children of their origins. But the converse is 
also true; it may make recipient parents less likely to tell if they perceive the DCO’s 
desire to contact the donor as a threat to their family relationships. The decision to 
disclose is likely to be influenced by more than the knowledge that the DCO will be 
able to, as an adult, identify and contact their donor. The cultural acceptance of (male) 
infertility, use of DI and acceptance of different family structures (i.e. heterosexual 
couples, same sex couples and single parents) also affect the decision making process 
(Frith 2001 pp.820-822; McWhinnie 2001 pp.814-815). 
For some recipient parents a belief that being a social parent is more important that 
being a genetic parent may make it easier to tell the DCO of their origins as the 
genetically related donor is not seen as a threat. Others may feel that as social 
parenting is more important there is no need to tell the DCO; identifying the genetic 
parent would not benefit them. A study by Golombok et al (2005 pp.291-292) found 
that the families of DCO had more positive parent-child relationships and greater 
emotional involvement with the DCO than the control group of naturally conceived 
families, showing the importance of good parenting, be it social or genetic.  
There are other advantages for the family in telling. In addition to preserving family 
structure and cohesion by maintaining trust and openness, recipient parents who had 
disclosed the information to their children viewed themselves as more competent. 
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There were fewer severe arguments with their children and fewer conduct problems 
(Lycett et al 2004 p176). Disclosing the information early, in a positive manner and 
with the knowledge that donor information is readily accessible, is likely to generate a 
more positive outcome for all concerned. 
Conversely, keeping secret the true origins of the DCO can have a deleterious effect on 
family relationships (Rowland 1985, McWhinnie 1986 cited in Lycett et al 2005 p811), 
undermining trust and honesty between parent and child and endangering openness 
and communication (Clamar 1988 cited in Lycett et al 2005 p811). The breakdown in 
parent-child relationship may make both the recipient parent(s) and DCO feel more 
rejected and isolated at a time when family support is likely to be crucial to securing a 
positive outcome for all.  
Accidental disclosure is a major concern for many recipient parents who have not told 
the DCO of their origins, whether they plan to tell or not. Around 50% of recipients tell 
a friend or family member the truth about the conception (Golombok et al 1999 p524, 
Gottlieb et al 2000 p2054) so the chances of accidental disclosure are high. 
But the issue is far from straight forward. Recipient parents must attempt to reconcile 
potential differences between their own interests (not wanting interference from the 
donor) and those of their child (access to information) to find a solution that puts the 
well-being of the DCO first (Breaeys et al 2005 p823). Leaving the decision of when and 
how to tell with the recipient parents gives them some control over the situation but 
also means that they should and will tell the DCO of their origins, and it assumes that 
knowing is in the DCO’s best interest. It is commonly accepted that whilst truth and 
honesty are best, they can be painful and damaging. Some children may prefer not to 
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know; they may be happy and secure within their family, or may fear the 
consequences of such a revelation. Family relationships are complicated and the 
impact of such a truth may be far wider than imagined.  
 
Attitudes towards the donor 
A reluctance to tell the DCO of their origins does not seem to stem from a negative 
attitude towards the donor. Many recipient parents are appreciative of and curious 
about the donor and have a generally positive attitude towards them. Some regret not 
being able to thank the donor (Vanfraussen et al 2001 p2022). Scheib et al (2003 
p1123) found that none “reported being angry, threatened, jealous, or resentful”. The 
donor themselves is not the problem but the threat they may pose to family life is. 
 
A family affair 
Before the introduction of the DDIR recipient parents were often advised to keep their 
use of donated gametes secret from even family and close friends. Many did so, or 
only shared the knowledge with selected people.  
If the truth became more widely known it had effects not only on the DCO, and on the 
relationship between the DCO and recipient parent(s), but also on the wider family. 
Some families reacted positively to the discovery but, as has been seen with donors, 
recipient parents and the DCO themselves, the discovery is not always easy, and 
creates a myriad of different emotions and reactions. 
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Chapter Six: The Families 
 
 
It is easy, and perhaps tempting, to examine DCO, donors and recipient parents either 
as individual entities or as a trinity. In reality, they exist as part of a wider family or 
social group, all of which can be affected by the decisions they each make (see 
Appendix 2 for a family tree showing some of the genetic, legal and social links 
surrounding the DCO).  
Families, in whatever form they come, are important and valued institutions. They are 
responsible for far more that simply passing down genetic material from generation to 
generation. Families nurture and protect, teach social behaviours and skills and are the 
place where “the child develops its own identity and feeling of self value” (Warnock 
1984 p8).  
The families in particular are often neglected in discussions about the impact of 
disclosure or non-disclosure. The reactions, or suspected reactions, of immediate 
family may be very important in the process of disclosure and identifying or contacting 
the donor. 
Where the recipient parents have chosen open-identity donation very few regret their 
choice and disclosure rates appear to be higher. They are more positive about their 
use of DI and that their child can obtain the donor’s identity and, importantly, 
disclosure did not have a negative impact on their families (Scheib et al 2003 p1115). 
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Spouses and partners 
UK gamete donors do not need the consent of a current partner in order to donate. 
Whilst some donors will inform their partners that they are donors, many will not 
(Sauer et al 1989 cited in Pennings 1996 p1135). A study by Cook and Golombok 
(1995(b) p954) found that only 21% of sperm donors were concerned about their 
current or future partner’s views on them being donors. Responses to discovering that 
their partner is a gamete donor are variable, and further complicated by the 
knowledge that the DCO may contact, and possibly have a relationship with, the 
donor. Much has been said about the threat that recipient parents may perceive this 
to be but little has been said about the effect this may have on the donor’s partner 
and family. 
“‘My wife seems to feel threatened by it and hit the roof when she found out I had 
told our kids about their half-brothers/sisters….. I think subconsciously she has 
concerns that family resources would be diverted to these children.’” (Jadva et al 2011 
p642). 
 
Siblings 
The HFE Act 1990 (1990(a)) specifically requires that the “welfare of any other child 
who may be affected by the birth” be taken into account before agreeing to provide 
treatment. Traditionally ‘any other children’ is taken to mean ‘any other children of 
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the recipient’ but following the change to open-identity donation it can be argued that 
it should also include ‘any other children of the donor’.  
DCO have three potential sets of siblings. They have ‘social siblings within the recipient 
family’ (who may or may not be genetically related to the DCO), ‘social siblings within 
the donor family’ (who are the children born to the donor naturally, not as a result of 
gamete donation) and ‘donor-siblings’ (who are DCO in other recipient families who 
share the same donor).  
 
Social siblings within the recipient family 
The effect on the ‘social siblings within the recipient family’ of the DCO identifying and 
contacting their genetic family and half-siblings is variable and ranges from relaxed 
and pleased to indifferent, jealous and threatened (Blyth 2012(b)). Even if the DCO’s 
discovery of their genetic family is supported by their recipient family it evidently has 
an impact on the relationships with social-recipient siblings, and may also change the 
dynamics of the relationship between the social-recipient siblings and their parents. 
This may be particularly evident in families with children from more than one donor, 
where not all of the donors reciprocate contact. 
 
Social siblings within the donor family 
This group of siblings is probably the most commonly overlooked, and is also the group 
with the fewest rights regarding the need-to-know or opportunities to contact DCO. 
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Although they are genetically related to the DCO and share the same donor of genetic 
material (albeit one via gamete donation) they have no right to initiate contact with 
the DCO. Additionally, there is no straightforward way for the DCO to contact them 
(private communication 2015). 
No attention appears to have be paid to their potential need to know their genetic 
siblings to form a sense of their own identity, or to their potential curiosity about 
other siblings. Some donors recognise the needs of their naturally conceived children: 
“‘The basis of making contact was not so much for me to personally meet my donor 
child and for her to know me as her genetic father, but rather for my 10 year old non-
donor daughter to one day meet her donor half-sibling and form a relationship’” 
(Jadva et al 2011 p643). 
This recognition does not appear to be universal, and is perhaps less likely if the donor 
has kept the donation secret from their partner and family. If the donor reciprocates 
contact with the DCO there is still no guarantee that this contact will include, directly 
or indirectly, the donor’s naturally conceived children.  
Additionally, as there is nothing to compel the donor to tell their family of their 
donation, the first the social siblings within the donor family may know of this is when 
the DCO make contact. This has the potential to create a range of feelings, from pride 
through to a deep sense of betrayal.  
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Donor Siblings 
Scheib et al (2005 p246) found that DCO were between moderately and very 
interested in having contact with donor-siblings. Many recipient parents also search 
for their child’s donor-siblings, mostly because they are curious but also to enhance 
the DCO’s sense of identity (Freeman 2009 p507). 
Contact between DCO and donor-siblings is likely to become increasingly common 
following the introduction of the DDIR but there has been little research into the 
experiences of DCO searching for and contacting donor-siblings. The potential for 
parents and children to form relationships with members of families who share the 
same donor is a significant consequence of the removal of donor anonymity that has 
yet to receive adequate attention.  Jadva et al (2010 pp.526-531) found that the two 
most common reasons for DCO to search for donor-siblings were curiosity (94%) and 
to help develop their sense of self (52%). This cohort of DCO reported that their search 
for donor-siblings had a neutral to positive impact on their relationship with their 
recipient parent(s) and that overall the experience of meeting donor-siblings was 
positive. However, it is important to note that the numbers of donor-siblings 
contacted in this study was low and much larger donor-sibling groups have been  
reported (a donor-sibling group of 150 has been identified in the US (Mroz 2011)).  
Whilst contact with donors and donor-siblings can be a positive experience the 
discovery of large numbers of donor-siblings can be a negative one, especially if not 
expected. The concept of family, already non-traditional, is further distorted for DCO 
discovering they have large numbers of donor-siblings. Overall it appears that little 
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thought has been given to how to prepare DCO identifying and contacting donor-
siblings and more work is needed in this area. 
 
The wider family 
Establishing contact with the donor will, in some cases, mean that contact can be 
established with the wider family. Contact from the DCO may be welcomed by the 
donor’s family. 
“‘My mom, who has no grandchildren, is thrilled with these additions to the family. My 
sister enjoys being an aunt….. I am very happy to know these kids and consider myself 
very fortunate’” (Jadva 2011 p643). 
Whilst this will undoubtedly be a positive experience for some, it will not be for all and 
it may increase the sense of threat to family life felt by recipient parents and possibly 
by the DCO themselves. It is important to remember that wanting to know more about 
the donor does not automatically translate into wanting a relationship with the 
donor/donor family. 
This may be difficult for donor families who do want a relationship with the DCO, 
especially as unlike recipient grandparents or other relatives they have no legal right 
to contact with the DCO. 
The wider family is not limited to the wider family of the donor. Jadva et al (2010 
p531) found that a trigger for many DCO searching for their donor-siblings and donors 
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was having children themselves. The importance of knowing one’s genetic identity 
appears to go beyond the needs of the DCO and includes others related to the DCO.   
 
Spider-web families 
Simply looking at the consequences of revealing, or concealing, the identity of the 
donor for the DCO, donor, recipient parent(s) and wider family unduly simplifies the 
relationships that exist between each and all of them (Snowdon and Snowdon 1994 
p603). The branches of the spider-web families are based on both direct and indirect 
genetic, social and legal links and “shared understandings and experiences” (Freeman 
at al 2009 p514).  
DCO (and the other children of the donor and recipient parent(s)) live in fragile webs 
of family and social relationships, which may be disrupted, or even broken, by the 
addition of new family members. Whilst the addition of family members may be 
positive it is important to remember that it will not be so in all cases, and that it may 
do irrevocable harm both to individual family members and to family relationships.  
There is no guarantee that genetic knowledge will equate to a greater happiness or 
sense of fulfilment; at its most basic level it is simply information but within the family 
it becomes “deep knowledge about one’s kinship network and also about one’s self” 
(Smart 2010). Thus it takes on great power and must be revealed and used 
responsibly.  
The importance of counselling and support is becoming increasingly recognised. 
Counselling is offered to donors and recipients around the time of donation and 
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treatment but many of the issues surrounding donation may not arise until years later, 
most commonly when the DCO wishes to access more information. The HFEA 
(2015(b)) is piloting a support and intermediary service for people affected by post-
donation issues, aimed primarily at donors and DCO, to support them through the 
process and implications of identification and contact. As the first cohort of DCO born 
after the DDIR will not be able to contact their donors until 2024, it will not be until 
then that the full implications of the DDIR, for donor, recipient parent(s), DCO and the 
wider family, will be felt but ensuring adequate support is in place before then is vital. 
Whilst knowing one’s genetic origins is important, it must also be stressed that genetic 
ties alone do not make a family.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
The importance of the DCO’s right-to-know is increasingly being recognised by 
recipient parents, but translating this understanding into action is problematic. 
Educating recipient parents as to why and how to disclose, in addition to giving them 
information to help answer the DCO’s questions about the donor is likely to help 
increase disclosure rates (Scheib et al 2003 p1116). 
The provision of counselling appears to be key to successful disclosure and ensuring a 
positive outcome for all involved. In Sweden, parents are counselled about disclosure 
and are expected to tell their DCO of their origins. A Swedish study undertaken after 
open-identity donation was legislated for showed that although relatively few 
recipient parents had told their DCO of their origins (11% of parents had told, 41% 
were planning to tell, 11% were undecided) disclosure rates were increasing (Gottlieb 
et al 2000 p2053).  
Respecting the “child’s autonomy” and maintaining the openness and truthfulness 
that are accepted as important for family relationships are “ethical demands, which 
[are] almost impossible to convert into a legal obligation” (Thévoz 1996 cited in 
Turkmendag et al 2008). Although the DDIR ensures that DCO can identify their donors 
once they reach 18, there is no legislation that ensures DCO are told of their origins; if  
they are not told they cannot exercise their right-to-know. Low disclosure rates, in 
combination with the DDIR, suggest that attitudes towards the acceptance and use of 
donor gametes still have a way to go – whilst it is accepted that the DCO have a right-
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to-know, informing them of their origins is clearly another matter. Unless legislation is 
introduced to ensure that DCO are told of their origins we must accept that recipient 
parents will continue to act paternalistically to protect their children, basing their 
decisions on whether, when and how to tell on what they believe is best for the DCO. 
They must balance their welfare-based decisions, which are likely to include the 
welfare of the wider family, with autonomy-based decisions that favour telling the 
DCO of their origins because they have a right-to-know.  
The importance and significance of the right-to-know have also been questioned. 
Whilst it is undoubtedly true that people have a right not to be deceived, the 
automatic assumption between knowing about genealogical kin and the creation of a 
relationship with them is less clear. Marilyn Strathern (1999 cited in Smart 2010) asks 
“Is it possible to want to ‘know about’ a father and yet not want to ‘relate’ to him in a 
substantive way? If so, are we in danger of conflating these two components when it 
comes to contemporary interventions in family life?” Similarly Fortin (2009 p338) 
comments that an increasing emphasis is being placed on the importance of biological 
ties, causing the right-to-know one’s genetic parents to develop into a “right to be 
with one’s parents”, a marked difference from the right to identify one’s genetic  
parents granted under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act (1998 HRA(b)). Human rights 
law does not support the idea that DCO have both a right to identify their donor and 
to know and have contact with them (Fortin 2009 p347). The DDIR is simply a 
disclosure of information about the donor. It is not, and should not be considered to 
be, a way of creating a ‘new family’. Turkmendag et al (2008) argue that where 
anonymity is removed, DCO may contact their donors “not necessarily because of a 
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‘natural’ desire to know their origins, but because such a desire is constructed, 
recognised and legitimized in the law”. 
 Although some DCO who contact their donors and donor-siblings will go on to 
develop meaningful relationships not all will, and there is a danger that a new 
normative standard is being created “that insists, for children at least, that knowing 
about is not enough and that emotional and physical closeness is also required” (Smart 
2010). 
Conflating the right-to-know with developing a relationship with the donor increases 
the strain felt by recipient families, and by donors and DCO themselves, and may in 
fact deter DCO from exercising their right-to-know. 
Honouring the rights of all the parties involved in and affected by gamete donation is 
simply not possible. The best that can be hoped for is a compromise, in which the 
rights of the individuals are carefully and fairly balanced against each other to decide 
whose rights are more in need of protection. When this is done, it becomes evident 
that the DCO’s right-to-know cannot and should not be given “absolute priority” 
(Besson 2007 p156, Fortin 2009 p347).  
Whilst the DCO’s right-to-know does not have absolute priority, they should not be 
deceived as to their origins, nor should DCO be denied the opportunity to find out 
more about their genetic identity. As Scott Baker J (Re R [2002])  said “A human being 
is a human being whatever the circumstances of his conception and an AID child is 
entitled to establish a picture of his identity as much as anyone else”.  
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The DCO right-to-know is important, and when the interests and rights of all the 
parties are given careful consideration it is rightly the ruling bioethical principle behind 
the DDIR, but insufficient consideration has been given to the rights of others affected 
by the donation, in particular the rights of the donor and donor’s naturally conceived 
children. Their wishes, needs and rights will be made increasingly known after 2024, 
when the first cohort of DCO are able to contact their donors under the DDIR. They too 
have a right to not to be deceived, a right to know their families and to understand 
their identities. The same arguments that have been used to support the rights of the 
DCO can often be used to support those same rights in the other interested parties. It 
is dangerous and foolhardy to simply consider the rights of the DCO as a stand-alone 
entity. Just as the family members are linked by their genetics, the law and their social 
environment, so too are their rights interlinked.    
The right-to-know is now enshrined in law, but it is important to remember that there  
is a difference between a need to know and a desire to know, between accessing 
information and creating a new family and between understanding our past and 
shaping our future.  
 
‘To whom related, or by whom begot?’ 
Alexander Pope,  
Elegy to the Memory of an Unfortunate Lady. 
 
Word count: 16133 
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Appendix 1 – Laura’s story 
 
 
This hypothetical case study has been designed to illustrate some of the issues raised 
by gamete donation and the DDIR, and to demonstrate the complexity of the spider-
web families created by using donor gametes. 
 
Michael Smith is a 34 year-old teacher. He is married, with one child.  Michael decided 
to become a sperm donor after a close friend suffered infertility problems. Michael 
and Margaret, his wife, are both supportive of sperm and egg donation. They have 
several friends who have needed help to conceive and believe gamete donors are truly 
altruistic. Despite this, Michael did not tell Margaret of his decision, fearing she 
wouldn’t approve. 
In 2005, Michael donated sperm through a local licenced clinic he found through the 
National Gamete Donation Trust. Michael donated after the introduction of the DDIR, 
as an open identity donor. He is aware of his legal position but has given little 
consideration to the prospect of any children born as a result of his donation 
contacting him in the future – 18 years is a long way off. Michael and Margaret 
continue with their lives and have 2 more children. Michael occasionally thinks about 
his donation but as the years pass he thinks about it less and less.  
The clinic use Michael’s donation to help Edward and Mary Jones conceive a baby girl, 
Laura. Initially, both Edward and Mary had decided that they would tell Laura of her  
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origins, but after she is born and people comment what a good father Edward is and 
how much Laura looks like him, they begin to have doubts. They were counselled at 
the clinic about disclosing the truth and they are aware that Laura, once she reaches 
18, can contact her donor, but they feel that she is happy and stable and it would only 
cause distress and upset to tell her. Edward is particularly reluctant to tell her as he 
feels they have a special father-daughter bond and he is concerned that he would be 
usurped by the donor. They know that the donor has no legal rights over Laura and 
they, in return, want nothing from him. 
Laura is a happy, healthy child and has no idea of her origins until she reaches 15, 
when Edward finally agrees to tell her the truth. 
Laura takes the news badly and is furious with her parents. They are confused, hurt 
and afraid that they may lose their daughter and that she may prefer her unknown 
donor to them.  
Laura feels let down and betrayed by Mary and Edward. She still loves them and 
considers Edward her father but she is struggling to understand why they kept this 
from her – her trust in her family has been badly damaged. Although her maternal 
family are supportive and loving, her paternal family have been more distant since the 
news and she feels rejected, confused and hurt. 
The wider family are shocked that Edward and Mary had kept such a big secret from 
them. Mary’s family is supportive; Laura is one of the family, no matter who her 
genetic father, and this does not change how they feel about her. They re-assure Mary 
and Edward that Laura’s desire to know about and have contact with her donor does 
not mean that she is rejecting them, or seeking to replace them, merely that she’s 
72 
SMUC MA Bioethics and Medical Law 
Dissertation BML7013 
Regnum 125498 
curious and wants to know more. Privately, they are concerned that the donor may 
seek to be a father to Laura and take her away from the family. 
Edward comes from a family with strongly held religious beliefs and they find the news 
harder to take. Not only are they hurt that this was kept from them, they also feel 
disapproval that such a method was used in the first place. They struggle to reconcile 
their feelings towards Edward and Mary and particularly towards Laura and there is a 
period of coolness between them. They do not want Laura to find out about her 
donor.  
Laura herself is curious about her donor. When she reaches 16 she accesses the non-
identifying information about him and at 18 she decides to contact him. She is not 
looking for a replacement father, she would just like more information about Michael 
and a family that she has never met. 
In 2024 Laura makes contact with Michael by letter. He is shocked; he has not thought 
about his donation for so many years he had almost forgotten about it. Laura’s letter 
does not say what she wants, only that she is his daughter and would like to meet him.  
Michael still has not told Margaret that he is a sperm donor. He made his donation 
purely altruistically to help somebody else become a parent. He does not want 
another child. He wishes Laura no harm but sees her as a potential threat to his 
existing family. 
Margaret finds Michael’s letter from Laura and is devastated. She feels betrayed, not 
because Michael donated sperm but because he did not tell her. Her sense of betrayal 
deepens when she discovers Michael knew that the donation had resulted in a 
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successful pregnancy. She is curious about Laura but fears for her family. She does not 
know what Laura hopes to gain by contacting Michael.   
After Laura makes contact, Michael and Margaret decide to tell their children about 
her. The children feel a similar sense of betrayal to Laura and Margaret; they have 
been lied to and their trust has been damage. Their feelings regarding Michael being a 
donor are mixed; they are proud but also hurt that they were never told, and angry 
because if Laura had not made contact they would never have known they have a half-
sister. However, they have an otherwise strong and open family relationship and this 
anger quickly turns to curiosity about Laura. They want to know more about her, but 
they don’t want another sister. 
Margaret too is curious so Michael decides to reciprocate contact. 
Michael and Margret decide to tell the wider family. Their feelings are mixed but most 
of the anger felt is because Michael was not open and honest, rather than because he 
was a sperm donor. They too are curious to know about Laura but they advise Michael 
and Margaret to continue cautiously. They ask them to think about how Laura’s 
parents may be feeling and advise Michael to make it very clear to Laura exactly how 
he fits into her life. 
After discussion with Margaret, their children and the wider family, Michael contacts 
Laura. He is very clear that he does not consider himself her father and does not want 
to be her father, but he is her donor and if he can help her ‘fill in the gaps’ he will.  
Laura is thrilled – after making contact she had worried that Michael might consider 
himself her father, when all she really wants at this stage is information.  
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Edward and Mary are relieved. They have been rebuilding their relationship with Laura 
and are now reassured that she considers them to be her parents. They can now allow 
themselves to feel excited for Laura, and for themselves, as they discover more about 
the donor who helped them to have a family. 
The wider families have, to varying degrees, come to terms with the situation and 
most are pleased, although some (notably Michael’s parents) still do not wish to have 
anything to do with discussions about the donation, donor, or the donor’s family.
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Appendix 2 - A Donor Conceived Family Tree 
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conceived 
offspring 
Recipient 
social 
sibling 
Recipient 
social 
sibling 
Donor 
social 
sibling 
Donor 
social 
sibling 
Donor 
sibling 
Child A Child B 
Recipient 
parent (2) 
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partner 
DCO’s 
partner 
Genetic link to DCO                                   
Legal link to DCO 
Link established via HFE Act and DDIR  
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